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JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1991)•

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

ISSUE I:

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

granting defendant's motion for PIP set-off and ordering that
$3,000 be deducted from plaintiff's judgment where the jury found
defendant to be 100% liable for causing the collision, yet awarded
plaintiff only $4,000 of his special damages, despite a stipulation
that plaintiff had incurred $7,815 of reasonable medical charges
which

arose

out

of

the

injuries

of

this

collision,

which

stipulation was presented to the jury in a jury instruction to the
effect that $7,815 had been incurred in accident related medical
expenses?

As a question of law, more particularly a question of

statutory interpretation involving the application of Utah Code
Annotated § 31A-22-3 09 (6), this Court accords no deference to the
conclusions of the lower court, but rather assesses the trial
court's conclusions for correctness. State v, Rio Vista Oil, Ltd.,
786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The following statute is determinative of the question at
issue in this appeal:
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309:
1

(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection
coverage is subject to the following:
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries
sustained by any person to whom benefits required under
personal injury protection have been paid by another
insurer, including the Workers1 Compensation Fund of
Utah, the insurer of the person who would be held legally
liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the payment,
but not in excess of the amount of damages recoverable;
and
(b)
that the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by
mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

Plaintiff and appellant Winton Aposhian brought this action in
the Third Judicial

District

Court to recover compensation

for

injuries he sustained as a result of an automobile collision.

The

trial resulted in a jury determination that Quimby was 100% at
fault for the collision, and that Aposhian had suffered medical
expenses in the amount of $4,000 and general damages in the amount
of $5,000.
granted

(R. 205-206).

defendant's

representing

the

On or about May 6, 1993, the trial court

motion

amount

for

defendant

a

PIP

was

set-off

allegedly

of

$3,000,

obligated

to

reimburse plaintiff's no-fault insurer, thereby allowing defendant
to deduct this $3,000 from the amount of the jury verdict.
268-269).

(R.

On or about May 7, 1993, plaintiff filed his notice of

appeal from the trial court's ruling on the PIP set-off.

(R. 272) .

On or about September 21, 1993 the Supreme Court poured this matter
over to the Court of Appeals for disposition.

2

(R. unnumbered as of

time plaintiff filed his brief, found at penultimate page of
record.)

Statement of Facts and Disposition

1.

On or about November 30, 1990, the vehicle drivien by

plaintiff Winton Aposhian was struck from the rear by a vehicle
driven by defendant Steve Quimby.
2.

(R. 3).

As a result of the collision of November 30, 1990,

Aposhian suffered personal injuries which required medical care.
(R. 3-4, 206).
3.

Prior to the trial of this action, the parties stipulated

to a summary of the reasonable charges for plaintiff's medical care
incurred as a result of the subject collision.
4.

(R. 114) .

At the trial of this action, an instruction was submitted

to the jury to the effect that the parties had stipulated to
"$7,815 incurred in accident related medical expenses."
5.

(R. 174.)

On or about February 25, 1993, the jury returned its

verdict, finding that the defendant was 100% negligent in causing
the collision of November 30, 1990, that plaintiff had suffered
injury as a result of the collision, and that plaintiff had
sustained damage to the extent of $4,000 for medical expenses and
$5,000 in general damages as a result of the subject collision.
(R. 205-206).
6.

On or about March 1, 1993, defendant made a post-trial

motion for PIP set-off, claiming that he was required to pay $3,000
3

to plaintiff's no-fault insurer, representing the amount paid to
plaintiff as no-fault benefits,
7.

(R. 213, et seq.).

Following submission of a memorandum

in support, in

opposition, and in reply, and after hearing oral argument, the
trial court granted defendant's motion, ordering that $3,000 be
deducted from the amount of the judgment.
8.
1993.

(R. 268-269).

Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal on or about May 7,
(R. 272).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff/appellant Winton Aposhian respectfully requests this
Court to reverse the ruling of the Third District Court, honorable
Richard Moffat presiding, ordering that the jury verdict be reduced
by $3,000, and reinstate the full jury verdict amount of $9,000.
The reason for this request is that the trial court erred in
deducting a PIP set-off of $3,000 where the jury reduced the amount
of plaintiff's stipulated reasonable medical charges incurred as a
result of the subject collision by $3,815.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
WHERE THE PLAINTIFF'S MEDICAL BILLS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REDUCED
BY THE JURY MORE THAN $3,000 BELOW THE STIPULATED REASONABLE
MEDICAL CHARGES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF THE COLLISION, NO PIP SETOFF SHOULD BE ALLOWED:

While it is true that the generally

accepted practice is to reduce plaintiff's award by the amount of
the PIP payments, if plaintiff has recovered PIP payments as part
of the jury verdict, it is equally true that no such reduction is
proper where the plaintiff's stipulated reasonable charges incurred
4

as a result of the subject collision have been reduced more than
$3,000 by the jury's verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUBROGATION OWED BY DEFENDANT TO PLAINTIFF'S
NO-FAULT INSURER SHOULD NOT BE DEDUCTED FROM THE
PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY, PARTICULARLY WHERE THE VERDICT
HAS ALREADY BEEN REDUCED PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY BY MORE
THAN THE AMOUNT OF THE PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION PAYMENTS
Utah Code Annotated § 31A-22-309(6)(a) provides, in pertinent
part, that "where the insured under the policy [which provides
personal injury protection ("PIP") coverage] is or would be held
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to
whom benefits required under personal injury protection have been
paid by another insurer,...the insurer of the person who would be
held legally liable shall reimburse the other insurer for the
payment".

Further, the following sub-section of U.C.A. § 31A-22-

309(6), part (b), provides that "the issue of liability for that
reimbursement and its amount shall be decided by mandatory, binding
arbitration between the insurers."

Defendant's contention before

the trial court, which that court agreed with in granting his
motion, is that, although the above-cited statutes provide for
resolution of the dispute between only the insurers, the tortfeasor
is entitled to deduct from the judgment the amount of the PIP
subrogation if the jury was not explicitly instructed that a
portion of plaintiff's medical bills were paid by his no-fault
insurer.

5

But where, as in the instant case, the injured party has
received less than the amount of his damages, particularly less
than the stipulated amount of his reasonable medical charges
arising out of the subject collision,

it is inequitable and

manifestly unjust to then further reduce his recovery by the amount
the tortfeasor's insurance company is obligated to pay to the
victim's no-fault carrier. Not only is it unjust and inequitable,
it is contrary to the pronouncements of the Utah Supreme Court on
this issue to reduce the victim's recovery twice, first by the
jury's verdict awarding him less than the stipulated reasonable
medical charges incurred as a result of defendant's negligence, and
then again by reducing the judgment.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed related issues in Allstate
Ins. Co, v, Ivie, 608 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980), in which a predecessor
statute to the current no-fault insurance code was at issue.

In

Ivie, the Court held, where there has been a payment by a no-fault
insurer to the tort victim, "[i]n order to present a completely
factual picture to the jury, the injured party may wish to present
evidence of all his medical bills or other economic losses." This
procedure was followed here, both by presentation of evidence
regarding plaintiff's damages and medical bills, as well as by jury
instruction number 11, which informed the jury that:
The stipulated facts are as follows:
$7,815.00 incurred in accident related medical expenses.
Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take these
facts as true for purposes of this case. (R. 174).

6

The Ivie Court further held that the proper procedure in such a
case is for
The court, by an appropriate instruction, ... [to]
explain to the jury that these economic losses have not
been included in the prayer for damages, because the
injured party has previously received reparation under
his own no-fault insurance coverage. Ivie at 1200.
Clearly, this procedure was not followed in the instant case, as
the plaintiff did pray for the full amount of his medical bills,
and no instruction was given informing the jury that a portion of
the medical bills had been paid previously.
The Ivie Court also held, however, that the substantially
similar predecessor statute to the current no-fault law did not
confer "on the no-fault insurer a right of subrogation to the funds
received by its insured for personal injuries."

Id. at 1202.

Rather, the Court held, the law
grants the no-fault insurer a limited, equitable right to
seek reimbursement in arbitration proceeding against the
liability insurer. [The no-fault law] cannot be deemed
as conferring subrogation rights on the no-fault insurer,
vis-a-vis its insured as to his recovery in a settlement
or legal action. [Emphasis added]. Id.
Yet despite this clear pronouncement by the Supreme Court that the
matter

of

subrogation

for no-fault

benefits

is between

the

liability insurer and the no-fault insurer only, and is not to
involve the tort victim, defendant is trying to do precisely what
the

Ivie

Court

forbade

—

bring

the

no-fault

insured,

the

plaintiff, into the matter and make him ultimately responsible for
the subrogation.
The confusion in this case is understandable, because the
facts of this case are slightly different than those in Ivie.
7

Here, despite the pronouncement of the Ivie Court, the trial court
allowed plaintiff to prove and plead for, and in fact submit to the
jury as stipulated, the full amount of his medical benefits (minus
an amount which the court determined, prior to trial, did not
represent necessary medical care arising from the collision).
Despite this proof, however, the jury deducted from its award
for plaintifffs medical bill some $3,815, in that it awarded only
$4,000, while the stipulated reasonable medical charges arising
from this collision totaled $7,815. In essence, the jury, whether
by serendipity or because of some knowledge obtained independently
of any instruction from the court, deducted from the stipulated
reasonable and necessary medical bills an amount greater than the
PIP payments which defendant now attempts to have deducted from the
verdict amount.
The net effect of the jury's reduction of plaintiff's medical
bills and the trial court's grant of defendant's requested PIP setoff is that plaintiff will recover only $1,000 for his medical
damages caused by defendant's negligence, when, by agreement and
stipulation between the parties the full value of such damages
totaled $7,815.

Far from a double recovery, plaintiff is being

twice penalized, in that the jury reduced his recovery by $3,815,
and the trial court further reduced this amount by $3,000.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in Laub v.
South Central Utah Telephone Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982), a
case with a great deal of factual similarity to the instant
dispute.

In Laub, the trial court allowed plaintiff to plead for
8

amounts previously paid by the no-fault insurer. The jury in Laub,
however, awarded the full amount of the medical damages, including
those amounts previously paid as PIP coverage, to the plaintiff.
The no-fault insurer, recognizing it had no right to proceed
against its insured, after the holding in Ivie, sought and obtained
recovery of the PIP amounts from the tortfeasor's insurer.

The

tortfeasor's insurer, after satisfying the full amount of the
verdict by two checks, one to the tort victim and his no-fault
insurer jointly for the PIP amount, and one to the tort victim
individually for the remainder of the judgment, attempted by a Rule
60(b) motion, to reduce the judgment against them by the amount of
the PIP payment.

Id. at 1305-1306.

The principle differences between the Laub case and the
instant dispute are: 1. the fact that the plaintiff recovered from
the jury the full amount of his damages, including medical bills
previously paid by PIP; and 2. the procedural posture of Laub, in
that the defendant first satisfied the judgment, then, when ordered
by an arbitrator to repay the no-fault insurer, attempted to reduce
the already satisfied judgment. In the case now before this Court,
the plaintiff did not receive the full amount of his stipulated
reasonable and necessary medical bills incurred as a result of the
collision caused by defendant, and the defendant followed a more
procedurally correct course of attempting to resolve the PIP setoff dispute before satisfying the judgment.
Defendant relies on Laub for the proposition that
if a plaintiff does improperly plead for previously
compensated damages and they are allowed to be included
9

in the judgment, the court should, at the conclusion of
the trial, either on its own initiative or on motion of
a party, reduce the judgment by the amount of those
previously compensated damages, and thereby prevent
double recovery. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 1307.
Because of the distinctions noted above, though, particularly the
fact that the plaintiff here did not recover the full amount of his
stipulated medical damages, the holding of the Laub Court is
inapposite here.

The key language in the passage cited above is

that the judgment is to be reduced
damages,

and

"by the amount of those

previously

compensated

thereby

prevent

double

recovery."

Here, the verdict did not award plaintiff amounts for

which he had been "previously compensated," because the jury
reduced his stipulated reasonable medical bills incurred as a
result of the collision by more than the amount of PIP payments he
had received.

By the same logic, then, there has been no "double

recovery," because plaintiff's recovery has been reduced by more
than the amount of his PIP payments.

It naturally follows that

defendant has already, by the jury's verdict, received his "setoff," and the trial court improperly allowed him a second "setoff," which plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to return to
him.
The clearest pronouncement by the Utah Supreme Court on this
issue came in Dupuis v. Nielson, 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), in which
the Court held that
To the extent that plaintiff would receive double
recovery of a particular type of damage, an adjustment of
the judgment in this case was appropriate. However, the
j udgment may only be reduced to the extent it
specifically and identifiably included special damages of
the same types as those for which no-fault benefits had
10

previously been received.
687.

[Emphasis added]. Id. at 686-

Here, there is no dispute that, by the jury's verdict, plaintiff's
damages have been reduced by more than the amount of the PIP
payments he has received. He has not received "double recovery of
a particular type of damage."

To the contrary, he received less

than his stipulated reasonable medical damages resulting from
defendant's negligence minus the PIP payments. To again reduce his
damages is to violate the Court's directive in Dupuis. Such double
reduction has the effect of reducing his judgment beyond "the
extent [to which] it specifically and identifiably included special
damages of the same types as those for which no-fault benefits had
previously been received."

For this reason, the decision of the

trial court is in error, and must be reversed.
The result sought by plaintiff does not violate Hill v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 864 (Utah 1988), in which the
Utah Supreme Court stated that
When the amount of damages incurred by the insured has
been judicially ascertained, the extent of the
subrogation right of the insurer is usually undisputed.
The insured is not entitled to double recovery, and the
[no-fault] insurer is equitably entitled to recover any
amounts from the insured that the insured recovered from
the tort-feasor. [Emphasis added]. Id. at 866.
It is important that the Hill Court stated that where the damages
have been judicially ascertained, the extent of the subrogation
right "is usually undisputed," and that the insured is not entitled
to "double recovery." The instant dispute is one of the rare cases
in which, even after judicial ascertainment of the amount of
damages, the extent of the no-fault insurer's subrogation right to
11

plaintiff's

recovery

is

disputed,

because

the

judicial

ascertainment of damages fell far short of the agreed, stipulated
amount of damages actually suffered by plaintiff. For this reason,
there is no chance that plaintiff will receive a "double recovery."
Consequently, the trial court erred in further reducing plaintiff's
award, and plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to reverse
this error.
CONCLUSION

This Court should reverse the trial court's order allowing a
PIP set-off of $3,000 from the judgment amount, because:

1.

The jury failed to award the full amount of plaintiff's

stipulated medical damages arising from defendant's negligence, but
rather reduced the amount by $3,815;

2.

Plaintiff will not receive a "double recovery," because

his damages have already been reduced by the jury's award;

3.

Defendant will not have to pay the amount of the PIP

subrogation twice, because the jury has already reduced the amount
of plaintiff's medical damages by more than the PIP subrogation
amount;

12

4.

It would be inequitable, unjust, and contrary to Utah

law, as stated in the Utah Code and by decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court, to twice reduce plaintiff's recovery.

Respectfully submitted this I J- day of November, 1993.
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN

ki
John Farrell Fay
Jim Mouritsen
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Winton Aposhian
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that four copies of the
foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully prepaid,
this

day of November, 1993, to:
T.J. Tsakalos
CONDER, WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120

hi
Jim Mouritsen
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EXHIBIT "A"
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John Farrell Fay - (Bar No. 5691)
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-0999
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
oooOooo
WINTON APOSHIAN,
STIPULATION TO SUMMARY
OF MEDICAL CHARGES

Plaintiff,

C i v i l NO. 9 2 0 9 0 0 3 3 9 P I

-vs-

Judge R i c h a r d M o f f a t

STEVE QUIMBY,
Defendant.
oooOooo

The

above-named

parties,

through

their

respective

counsel, .iiereby stipulate that '"the smnmary-of--plaintiff '.s -medical
charges (a copy of which is attached as Exhibit W A") represent
reasonable charges for medical services plaintiff Winton Aposhian
incurred as a result of the subject collision, and that these
amounts may be entered into evidence without the need of further
foundation.

+Ar

DATED this

IS.

day of January, 1993.
S:&S3iaSR£ES .& JENSEN

DATED this

IL

day of
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH

^9nf

EXHIBIT "B"

15

INSTRUCTION NO.

//

Before the trial of this case, the Court held a conference with the lawyers for the parties.
At this conference, the parties entered into certain stipulations or agreements, in which they
agreed that facts could be taken as trae without further proof. By this procedure, it is often
possible to save much time.
The stipulated facts are as follows:
$7,815.00 incurred in accident related medical expenses.

Since the parties have so agreed, you are to take these facts as true for purposes of this
case.

EXHIBIT "C"

16

~hirci Judicial District

MAY - 6 1993

T. J. TSAKALOS (3289)
Of CONDER, WANGSGARD & TSAKALOS
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, UT 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
WINTON APOSHIAN,

1 ORDER REGARDING SET-OFF

Plaintiff,
vs.

1

STEVE QUIMBY,

1

I Civil No. 93^0900339 PI
I Judge Richard Moffat

Defendant.
The defendant's Motion for Set-off coming before the court
for hearing of April 9, 1993, John Farrell Fay, appearing on
behalf of the plaintiff and T. J. Tsakalos, appearing on behalf of
the defendant, and the court having reviewed the memorandum filed
by counsel and hearing oral argument of counsel,
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES THAT:
Defendant's Motion for Set-Off is granted and the verdict and
ultimate judgment will be reduced by $3,000.00, representing the
P.I.P. subrogation claim of State Farm Insurance, the insurer for

r\ O n O

plaintiff.
DATED this

71)^**
1993.

day of

^^-rt^^J-'

ard Moffat ^\^><Ll I
Court Judge.?fec7^/

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this

/$

day of April, 1993, I

mailed a true and exact copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING
SET-OFF, postage prepaid, to the following:
John Farrell Fay
SIEGFRIED & JENSEN
310 East 4500 South, Suite 620
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

&u£

